HS2 Reset

The High Speed 2 railway has had numerous resets yet it clings on to its existence albeit in a truncated form. The latest announcement by the Secretary of State for Transport followed the publication of the Lovegrove report into what went wrong, and some interim recommendations from the on-going review of how the project should be reset that is being conducted by HS2’s CEO, Mark Wild. The Lovegrove report is useful because it finally nails the claim repeated over many years by politicians and many of those directly involved in the HS2 project, that its core aim is to increase railway capacity. It was designed for high speed, hence the name; indeed for higher speeds than anywhere in Europe.

HS2 has incurred all the extra cost that goes with adherence to a rigidly straight line in order to maximise speed. One of the interim recommendations is to reduce the speed – too late for the construction savings, but justified by a reduction in the cost of testing the new trains. As Mark Wild has previously acknowledged in evidence to the GLA Transport Committee, Crossrail was able to control costs by minor adjustments to its route, thereby avoiding the need to demolish buildings and reduce the need or the levels of compensation to those whose properties are affected.

Mark Wild is clear about a significant cause of the cost over-run: that contracts were let before the scope the project was fully developed. He has not, however, addressed the issue of why contracts were let in a hurry. He is keen to assure us that there are many good people at HS2, no doubt because as CEO he has to work with them. Many of the “good people” were the whistle blowers who were sacked for their pains by bad people. Vested interests sought to bulldoze Parliament by entering commitments which could then be used to persuade Ministers that the cost of pulling the scheme made that prohibitive. As Simon Jenkins writes in The Guardian, there is too much emphasis on sunk costs, and the risks of throwing good money after bad seem to have escaped successive Ministers and civil servants.

The cost of compensating those who lost their homes and livelihoods was deliberately understated. Bernadette Kelly, the civil servant chiefly responsible at the Department of Transport, admitted that the knowledge that £55.7bn (2015 prices) was unrealistically short of the true cost was with-held from Parliament in order not to scare MPs into rejecting the legislation to authorise the scheme.

Questions remain over the approaches to Euston and the nature of the station at the end of them. Frequent references to the tunnelling now in progress from Old Oak Common are to “Euston”. The tunnels extend only as far as Parkway, almost a mile from Euston, and there is still no agreed scheme for the route from there to the station. The “Birdcage” which was proposed to provide acoustic and environmental protection for residents and businesses from Parkway onwards to Euston and was included in the Act has long been abandoned. Designs for the station have been twice revised and the number of platforms reduced from 11 to 10 and then 6, but there is still a lobby for passive provision for three more platforms at a later date. The revisions were prompted by a desire to reduce costs, but costs are rising as fast as the number of platforms falls.

What should be done to escape this never-ending saga? It has been reported that the Government again looked at the option of pulling the plug. HS2 Ltd may consistently under-estimate the cost of the project, but they have no problem in finding costs that would arise if the whole thing were to be cancelled. Now that the cu-down scheme no longer reaches Manchester and Leeds, its cost:benefit ratio is so poor that operating it would be a further and long term drain on resources. There are already competing services between London and Birmingham, with better connections to onward destinations. (Curzon Street was chosen as the terminus in Birmingham to avoid existing lines: it was put forward that this would obviate the need to disrupt existing services during construction. The West Coast Main Line upgrade had involved years of weekend disruption for minimal benefit, and criticism of it underscored thinking on HS2).

One of the worst features of the current scheme is that rather than increasing capacity, as repeatedly claimed, it seems actually to involve a worsening of capacity north of Birmingham. The order for eight-car trains, while it might be sufficient for the Birmingham service, would not be attractive for trains to Manchester, the north-west and Scotland, where the eleven-car Pendelino trains offer more seats.  Moreover, the currently planned means of reaching Manchester, following the cancellation of phase 2A by the previous government, takes trains on to the slower freight line and results in longer journey times than currently obtain.  There is no scope for enhancing frequency, and in any case higher capacity trains are a more efficient means of carrying passengers.

What has not been considered is the option of re-purposing what has already been built. A link from the Elizabeth Line to East-West rail would offer something new. East-West Rail, from Cambridge to Oxford, is a firm commitment, although it has had its own problems and lengthy delays. A station where HS2 crosses the line would open up new links, and could provide the opportunity for a genuine New Town. Too many of the New Towns under consideration are extensions of existing towns and cities; this would better meet the government’s aspirations.

As Mark Wild continues to work on the reset, lateral thinking outside the box from experts without a personal interest in the outcome is what is needed.

Andrew Bosi, Trustee